Verne's Volvo, et al.

While at a certain point, Verne should probably have just bought a new car altogether and made this conundrum infinitely less complex, I think the car which is heaped in the back of Grace’s garage is “Verne’s Volvo” in terms of identity. When talking about physical existence, there is a clear distinction between which parts are from the original Verne’s Volvo and which parts consist of a new car that is actually in Verne’s possession. There are several parts which define recognizable identity from different perspectives. There is a physical recognition of the parts, in regards to which a clear distinction can be made between the new and old parts. The relation of those physical parts to the owner, and the recognition of that relationship composes the legal identification in terms of possession of the car which would say that the working amalgamation of new parts in Verne’s possession is Verne’s Volvo and that he has a right to that Volvo and not the parts which he has relented to Grace. The other aspect, but perhaps not the last, is the metaphysical identity which we as conscious, feeling beings ascribe to certain physical objects which establishes identity in a much more “real” sense than I think can be described by pure tangible identity.
    The identity which I am defending as Verne’s Volvo is dependent on relationship to an object. Verne has a history with the physical object which he bought originally which was “conditioned” in a way through his experience with that physical object. It means something to him. The physical object in a tangible sense, has no conscious identity which changes with its own will, but rather an identity is created through its relationship with a conscious being who can ascribe a certain metaphysical, immaterial value to it, thus creating an identity based on that individual’s experience and conceptualization of that object. There is an innate complication however, as the identity of the car as a whole can be different from the individual parts. Thus, we introduce temporality as part of the identity equation as we must understand different identity of the “car as a whole” at a specific moment in time. In a way, the car has a distinct identity every time the car changes parts or even goes through a different experience with Verne, thus changing his conceptual idea of the car and therefore the car’s identity. Those identities all exist independently of each other and in a way, without a causal relationship, however we, and Verne, understand the differences and changes in identity through time, so temporality now plays a piece in understanding the identity. Let’s say Verne went on a road trip and lost a side mirror when a goat ate it. For the purpose of staying with the original story, we can say he salvaged the remainder of the side view mirror to the point of usability, however it was permanently severed from the car so he bought a new one when he returned to Grace’s auto shop.  His concept of the car could have changed with the goat incident, and as a piece of his car was removed that involved the goat incident, his concept of the car in relation to the goat incident does not change. That memory and conceptualization is still captured in the identity of the car as a whole, however the individual piece which was necessary for the memory to occur remains in the back of Grace’s garage. At the same time, however, both the car without the memory of the goat, the car with the memory of the goat, and the memory of the goat and the side view mirror individually all can exist. Since we understand the conceptualization though temporality however, the identities all seem different in a metaphysical sense, however they still all exist in a way. Which conceptual identity Verne chooses to connect with depends on Verne and which memories and ideas about the car remain most powerfully apparent in his mind when thinking about the concept of his car.
    Not knowing Verne, his tendencies, his psychology, his philosophical conceptions about the world, I cannot necessarily draw a definite conclusion about which concept of his car that he would attach the identity of his car to. I can speak personally, however, to how specific objects and individual parts connect to my concept of physical objects much more than utilized wholes. The utility of Verne’s car, the newness, the fact that he has working parts, would not define its metaphysical identity more than its practical use, but rather my experiential relationship with my memories and concepts of individual parts which have been removed would form the identity of the car to me. I connect with experience and feeling to form such an immaterial identity more than anything, and if it were my Volvo to have rebuilt, I would have identified the one in the back of Grace’s shop as the Volvo which was mine in identity, however the one in my possession now as the car which is practically mine.